The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States by Miles L. Colean
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in
the United States





Chapter Title: 5. The Question of Credit Policy
Chapter Author: Miles L. Colean
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5929
Chapter pages in book: (p. 76 - 86)CHAPTER 5
The Question of Credit Policy
T
HEpreceding chapters have discussed impacts upon real estate
finance that have resulted from the substantive law of real
property, the development and execution of public land policies,
the growth of governmental restrictions on land use, the vicissi-
tudes of mortgage lending operations, and the supervision of finan-
cial institutions. Nowhere, up to the depression of the 1930's, do
we find much that could be called an official policy for the financ-
ing of real estate or any effort on the part of state or federal
governments to use the power to expand or restrict credit as a
means for consciously guiding real estate activity.
Throughout the whole period of national expansion, the role
of the federal government in respect to real estate was that of en-
couraging the settlement of the public domain and promoting a
wide dispersion of land ownership. Aside from the dis.tribution of
land to settlers and land grants to land companies and canal and
railroad companies, it provided few direct aids and offered no
interference to the functioning of the real estate market or to the
efforts of the states to deal with that market in their own ways.
Moreover, beyond the continuous demands for greater privileges
for homesteaders, there appears to have been neither pressure for
federal intervention nor any broadly held opinion that the provi-
sion of special real estate credit facilities was within the federal
jurisdiction.
During the same period, the role of the states was mainly con-
cerned with policing fraud, adjudicating disputes in private trans-
actions, chartering and supervising private lending institutions,
and intervening more directly only when depressions forced them
to extend special relief for debtors. Even the "agrarian revolt" of
the last quarter of the nineteenth century brought forth no specific
plans for a real estate credit system, but rather concentrated its
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efforton such matters as railroad rates and general monetary
reforms.'
CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL
INTERVENTION
After the failure of the early land bank experiments, the possibil-
ities of the use of credit facilities and credit policy as a means for
strengthening and advancing a land policy were only gradually
recognized. Effective realization, in fact, did not commence until
about the time of World War I, and the full bloom was not reached
until after the close of World War II.
Renewed interest in credit measures resulted from the growing
dissatisfaction with the conservatism of state law in face of chang-
ing credit requirements and the apparent inability of the states to
cope with the effects of the over-exploitation of land resources.
Impatience for reform brought pressure for action by the federal
government. And the federal government, considered at the time
to be restricted from direct action except in its own diminishing
domain, or in situations involving interstate commerce, found that
credit could be an instrument for accomplishing many objectives.
It could be used to foster a dispersion of land ownership; to main-
tain small ownerships, both rural and urban; to favor one type or
method of land improvement over another, or certain classes of
borrowers as opposed to others; and to bring about reforms in land
utilization, farming methods, and urban building and pianning.
The remainder of this study will be largely concerned with the
method by which these objectives were pursued. What is important
to note here is that the more direct concern with real estate credit
as an instrument of public policy brought with it a number of new
considerations. Obviously, more was involved than mere influence
on the supply of funds for mortgage lending, although this, of
course, remained of crucial. importance. First, the more or less
negative and impersonal. type of regulation characteristic of state
law had to be supplemented or supplanted by a more dynamic sort
of intervention that concerned itself less with restraint and protec-
tion than with needs, incentives, and positive guidance. Second,
where the continuing conservatism of state law imposed obstacles
1See,for instance, Ray Allen Billington, Western Expansion (New York, 1949)
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to the new objectives, some means of circumvention had to be
provided-_a requirement that clearly pointed to action by the fed-
eral government. Finally, if credit was to become the instrument
for the positive guidance of real estate activity and land use, special
attention had to be given to the terms of credit—the rate of interest,
the loan-to-value ratio, and the period of repayment—as the means
by which a credit policy might be effectuated and made of the
greatest possible benefit to those for whom it was devised.
BACKGROUND OF REGULATION OF CREDIT TERMS
The regulation of the terms under which credit was issued as a
means of effecting moral, social, or economic objectives is, of
course, not entirely a new thing. Like most other currently used
means of control, it reaches far back into history.
The interest rate, in particular, has been subjected to a long
and varied scrutiny by government. Throughout the Middle Ages
interest carried the opprobrious label of usury and was banned as
immoral. Economic compulsion, however, finally overcame the
interdiction. Adam Smith relates the progress toward respectability
from the statute of Henry VIII of 1545, which had the effect of
legalizing interest not in excess of 10 percent, to the renewed ban
under Edward VI, the restoration of legal interest with a 10 per-
cent maximum rate in the time of Elizabeth, and the gradual reduc-
tion in the recognized rate to 5 percent under Anne. He concludes:
"All these statutory regulations seem to have been made with.great
propriety. They seem to have followed and not to have gone before
the market rate of or the rate at which people of good
credit usually borrowed." 2
Thusthe offense of usury came to be not that of charging inter-
est, but of charging excessive interest as defined by a statutory limit
set in relation to, but not less than, a recognized rate broadly
obtainable in the market. Regulation was no longer based on moral
grounds but was aimed solely to protect the weak and uninformed
borrower from the exactions of an unscrupuious lender. The rea-
sonableness even of this type of regulation was denied by Jeremy
Bentham.3 The Bentham doctrine gradually made headway in
2AdamSmith, The Wealth of Nations (Modern Library ed., New York, 1947)
Book I, p. 89.
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England when the interest rate came to be recognized as being
dependent solely upon considerations of risk and the supply of and
need for capital. Demand for legal restraint upon the interest rate
lessened, until in 1850 the English statutory rate was repealed on
all loans except those on real estate and, in 1854, regulation of the
mortgage rate ceased.4
In t.he United States, laissez faire has never been applied to in-
terest rates with the full logic of the English example. It is true,
of course, that by the time of the first colonization of this continent
the legitimacy of interest had been firmly established; and, in any
event, the needs of credit were so great that a moral proscription
could not have been effective. Nevertheless, because the demand
for credit so often exceeded the supply, an unrestrained operation
of the money market, such as came to be the situation in England,
was not considered feasible here.
The principle accepted by Adam Smith—that of the
tion of an assumed going rate of interest—rather than the Bentham
principle of absolute freedom has been characteristic of Ameri-
can law. Nearly every state has some restrictive legislation affect-
ing interest rates.5 The problem in applying this type of regulation
is to assure that the going rate is in fact one that is widely ac-
ceptable in the market. The danger always exists that legislators
will act on the premise that the interest rate can be what govern-
ment says it should be and that, consequently, the legal rate may
be set at a. point actually lower than the market will accept. Fur-
thermore, owing to changes in the market, a once acceptable rate
may lose its comparability with the going rate even where an
original identity may have existed.°
Here we find further evidence of the conflict in governmental
objective that is characteristic of our system of real estate finance.
The with its special concern to
protcc t the borrower in time of stress, undoubtedlyh as added to
the risk of has hada tendency to raise the interest rate
to cc npat e legal
4AnAct to Repeal the Laws Relating to Usury and to the Enrolment of Annui-
ties, 17th and 18th Victoria, c. 90, August 10, 1854.
5FrancisW. Ryan, Usury and Usury Laws (Boston, 1924).
OThehistory of the fixed 4 percent interest rate on loans made under the Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944 (see Chapter 7) provides a vivid example of these
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freezing of the rate at a level unaUractive to investors either lessens
the availability of loan funds, or leads to invention of devices
that havLe the effect of increasing the loan yield, or both.
Thus we find that, even before the depressed 1930's, many farm
states were in the midst of a credit famine. In some of them, avail-
able capital was much below what was needed, as investment was
diverted to presumably more profitable, or less uncertain, fields.
For urban property, the difficulties were. no less real than for farm
property. In spite of efforts to restrain rates, the actual costs of
borrowing on mortgage security, including commissions, bonuses,
discounts, renewal fees, and similar devices, put the môrt-
gage loan rate far above the nominal legal rate.7
The states, therefore, found it almost impossible to combine
low interest rates, high protection for borrowers, and ample loan
funds. As the years passed, the tolerance born of prosperity also
passed; and the onsetting depression aroused demands for an equa-
tion of these mutually hostile elements.
Along with the interest rate, borrowers found other difficulties
in making satisfactory loan arrangements. Owing mainly to restric-
tions on institutional lending, which again reflected the state's
estimate of the hazardous nature of the transaction, loan-to-value
ratios were generally low, with the result that the purchase might
be deferred until sufficient equity had been accumulated, or costly
second, and even third, mortgage financing might be resorted to.
Here the effort to protect those who placed their funds with lend-
ing institutions ran directly counter to the policy of promoting
small ownerships. Again, state legislatures made little headway in
resolving the dilemma; and, again, resort was finally had to the
federal government to reconcile incompatibles.
Perhaps even more serious was the problem of repayment. Al-
though the repayment of principal, unlike the payment of interest,
has never been considered outright immoral, there have, as we have
observed, been occasions when it has been postponed or modified
by governmental intervention. These repeated breachings of the
7SeeAlbert Farwell Bemis, "The Economics of Shelter," The Evolving House
(Cambridge, Mass., 1934) Vol. 2, pp. 367-76. Bemis points out the wide variations in
rates among the states as well as their high general level of mortgage interest rates
during the 1920's. Some estimates placed the effective interest rate on second mort-
gage loans as high as 18 percent, while the rate on most such loans appears to have
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mortgage contract may have had some influence in establishing the
incongruous practice of making mortgage loans—which are essen-
tially of a long-term character—on a short-term basis, in the hope of
getting payment before a new catastrophe and a new moratorium
intervened.
In prosperous times, and in rapidly growing parts of the coun-
try, the incongruity of making a short-term loan for a purpose that
required a long termrepayment was not always apparent. Re-
newals were usually possible, frequently without curtailment at the
end of the customary three- to five-year loan period; and, in some
instances, an increase in property values actually served to reduce
the apparent proportion of loan to value. Depressions, however,
brought disaster when they coincided with due dates; and the spec-
tacular waves of foreclosures attending each major economic de-
cline were eloquent testimony that the short-term mortgage loan
was dangerous for lender as well as borrower.
Clearly, some other way was needed to protect the lender from
the hazards of the mortgage business. At the same time, a method
was needed that would allow the borrower to repay his loan by
small payments spread over a longer period of years. The experi-
ence of some savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks,
and insurance companies with amortized loans indicated their
greater safety. It was also obvious that the longer the period
which amortization could be extended, the lower would be the
individual payment, and the greater the number of persons
could meet it. Thus, a general acceptance of the principle of
ment by regular amortization would provide an important means
for advancing the dispersion of land ownership. The states,
ever, appeared to be unlikely to take positive steps in this
INTERVENTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
With supervision of financial institutions stiffened as a result of
the disasters of the early 19S0's, the states were handicapped by
the rigidity of their own policies which made credit tightest just
at the time some relaxation was required. The federal government
was drawn into this situation on the wave of popular unrest that
demanded new principles to replace old precedents. Many of these
new ideas were greatly at variance with under which the82. IMPACTOF GOVERNMENT
federal government first entered the field of real estate credit.8 The
responsibility that thederal government assumed wastwofold.It
not only undertook—as a depression remedy—to assure easier credit
generally as well as to make special provision for farm and home
financing, but, with steadily increasing, clarity and emphasis, it also
asserted its obligation to provide "adequate" farms and "decent"
homes for those lacking them.
To accomplish these objectives, manipulation rather than mere
regulation of credit terms was required; and the interest rate, the
loan-to-value ratio, and the method of repayment were all of a
piece in providing an instrument for such positive action. The
courses open to the federal government in making effective use of
this instrument were several:
(I) It could charter mortgage lending institutions, using federal
funds when necessary to encourage their establishment and to
assure their adherence to federal policy.
(2) It could create institutions wholly financed and controlled by
government, and thereby set lending terms in accordance with its
estimate of credit needs.
(3) It could, by assuming a major part of the lender's risk, encourage
private institutions to lend at a submarket interest rate, with
lower down payments and longer repayment periods.
(4) It could subsidize interest rates by making partial payments from
public funds.
(5) It could actually reduce interest to a negative quantity, by grant-
ing subsidies to certain classes of borrowers.
(6) It could, through various fiscal devices, depress the market rate
of interest.
In a relatively few years all of these methods have been used,
and the scope of each method, once established, has generally been
widened far beyond initial limitations. By and large, tbe:methods
followed for cheapening credit parallele&th.e methods se-
lected for expanding the. availabilityof credit. Before discussing
these matters more fully, however, it is important to note how the
interventionary attitude shifts from conventional and orthodox
theories of credit operations to almost reverse practices.
The first step, whether in an agricultural or urban environ-
8Thiswas the in 1916. See the next
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ment, is to establish, or encourage the establishment of, new insti-
tutions, or to encourage the wider use of existing facilities in areas
or circumstances where a greater availability of credit is desired.
The primary purpose is to augment and direct the flow of funds.
Interest rates, while lower than those produced by a scarcity
don, are still recognizable as customary rates for borrowers of good
credit standing. In the selection of borrowers the ordinary criteria
prevail. The borrower must be an acceptable credit risk, and, gen-
erally speaking, the best risks get the best terms.
The second step proceeds, through direct use of federal capital,
or of guarantees to private institutions, to create lower interest
rates and more liberal provision for repayment than would be
offered even to borrowers of the best credit rating for the types of
loans involved. An element of subsidy may enter the picture to
the extent that contingent liabilities may result in claims on the
government and certain costs of administration are carried by ap-
propriations rather than by the operation itself. Borrowers are still
selected on the basis of presumed ability to pay, but the possible
range of differentiation in terms has been so reduced that all
selected borrowers receive about the same treatment irrespective
of differences in their resources and capacity.
The third step, by a more drastic use of the methods employed
in the second, and with greater evidence of present or deferred
subsidy, offers terms far beyond those obtainable in the private
financial market. At this stage borrowers are selected because of
their need for help and their inability to meet the terms otherwise
available; and the better. class of credit risks may be excluded from
use of the special facilities.
The fourth step eliminates all financial considerations except
the need of the borrower for funds. The use of subsidy is outright—
either to reduce the effective interest rate or the proportion of the
loan amount that must be repaid, or both. The beneficiary may be
an individual borrower for farm or home, or the client of a public
authority to which the subsidy is granted.
The steps outlined have not always been taken in the order
given, nor does the taking of an additional step mean an abandon-
ment of methods previously adopted. Moreover, the stages are not
always as clear-cut as described, since frequently there is a blending
of methods. At the present time all methods are being used, the84 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
trend being toward greater experimentation with the third and
fourth.
All fields of real estate finance, of course, are not directly af-
fected, since the emphasis so far has been on agricultural and
housing finance. Yet, during World War II extra-market financing
was provided by the government for industrial and commercial
property related to the war effort, and, in the postwar period, sim-
ilar facilities were offered to classes of industrial property con-
nected with the drive for increasing the production of prefabri-
cated houses and of building materials for residential construction.
EMERGENCE OF A NEW ATTITUDE
TOWARD CREDIT
The shifting of the government's attitude toward credit terms has
been accompanied by a profound, if not always clearly expressed,
change of attitude toward the nature of capital. In the middle
period between medieval prohibitions and the present type of
intervention, the accepted theory was that financial capital repre-
sented a pooi of savings available for productive purposes, that
interest represented the inducement necessary to create the savings,
and that the rate of interest was the measure of the incentive nec-
essary at any given time not only to the creation of the capital fund
but to the direction of its flow toward the various investment
opportunities. -
Theplace of government under this theory (if, indeed, it was
admitted that government had any direct concern with the finan-
cial operation) was the creation of an environment favorable to
saving (by the maintenance of a sound currency and the protection
of investors in financial institutions) and the protection of weak
borrowers against avaricious creditors. By and large, it was assumed
that a pooi of savings would naturally be created by the existence
of opportunities for remunerative investment, that savings would
flow without compulsion into productive uses, and that, irrespec-
tive of state action, the rate of interest would be determined by the
supply of and demand for funds at any moment and the degree of
risk in the particular investment.
The new attitude stems from quite a different point of view.
It assumes first of all that, in a highly industrialized economy, there
need no longer be any special incentive to save. As stated before theCREDIT POLICY 85
Temporary National Economic Committee by Adolph A. Berle,
Jr.: ° "When the scientific development which began in 1900
to reach its peak, we suddenly found ourselves in a state of affairs
which is frequently described as a surplus economy, by which I
mean that the productive mechanism of the country could produce
more than the effective demand. At that point there was no partic-
ular need to bribe or cajole or reward anyone for not consuming,
because if he consumed everything he was able to there was still
r
capacity left over, and at that point the economics have distinctly
changed."
As a corollary to this assumption, it was taken that the compel-
ling factor in the investment process was no longer the incentive to
the saver, but the need for capital funds, and that the rate of inter-
est was not to be determined by what is necessary to cajole a saver
but, as Berle puts it, by what was needed to get a particular job
done. It was. the nature of the investment, not the.
requ investor, that the terms
of the loan. If the job of interest, then that
what it should. get.'°
This attitude will be clarified by further quotation from Berle's
testimony: 11 "The noncommercial business, like a hospital or low
cost housing, or. the semi-commercial business, like middle-class
housing, cannot pay the same kind of rate of interest which a com-
mercial enterprise pays....Ourfirst concern ought to be to work
out a banking system which can quote a rate of interest which will
take the business. If that rate happens to be a nominal one for
something which isn't going to make any profit, then that is the
rate to quote. If it happens to be, let us say, a 1- or 1½- or 2-percent
rate for middle-class or lower middle-class housing which is not
being built by anybody today, then quote that rate. If it happens to
be a commercial enterprise, making the standard commercial rate,
then quote that rate."
Although this theory has not been explicitly stated in leg-
islation, it is implicit in federal credit measures since the Farm
9 U. S. Congress. House. Hearing before the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee (Washington, 1940) 76th Congress, 1st sess., Part 9, Savings and Investment,
p. 3814.
10 Ibid., p. 3822.
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Loan Act of 1916.12 It became fully evident in the repeated efforts,
following World War II, to manipulate the interest rate and other
terms on insured and guaranteed mortgage loans so as—despite a
contrary market trend—to make borrowing easy for veterans and
to reduce the cost of buying or renting housing constructed during
the period of postwar inflation. In the process, a new realm of
conflict and inconsistency has been created. A financial system
based upon, and apparently to a large extent still motivated by, one
concept of the investment process is overlaid by demands arising
from awhollycontradictory point of view.
l2See Donald C. Horton, Interwar Credit Aids Associated with Farm Ownership
and Operation, Department of Agriculture (Washington, 1945) mimeographed.